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Abstract
This paper analyzes data from a recently completed study of discrimination
against African-American and Hispanic homebuyers when they visit mortgage
lending institutions in two major metropolitan markets to make pre-application
inquiries. It represents the first application of paired testing to rigorously measure
discrimination in the mortgage lending process. The paired tests isolated signifi-
cant levels of differential treatment on the basis of race and ethnicity in Chicago
with African Americans and Hispanics receiving less information and assistance
than comparable whites. Adverse treatment of African-Americans and Hispanics
is also observed in Los Angeles for specific treatments, but the overall pattern of
treatment observed did not differ statistically from equal treatment. Multivariate
analyses for Chicago indicate that large lenders treat minorities more favorably
than small lenders and that lenders with substantial numbers of applications from
African-Americans treat African Americans more favorably than lenders with pre-
dominantly white application pools.
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Introduction
Considerable evidence indicates that minority homebuyers are less likely than
whites to obtain mortgage loans and, if they are successful, receive less favorable loan
amounts and terms.  Racial and ethnic disparities in loan denial rates are consistently
found in data collected as part of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) across
income categories, loan types, and markets (Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman, 1996;
Holloway and Wyly, 2002).  More formal analyses of lender underwriting behavior, such
as Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and McEneaney (1996), Schafer and Ladd (1981), and
King (1980), all find evidence of racial and/or ethnic differences in mortgage
underwriting.  Finally, the few studies that have considered the price of credit, such as
Crawford and Rosenblatt (1999) and Courchane and Nickerson (1997), also find
significant racial differences in lending practices.
However, considerable disagreement persists about the extent to which
discrimination is the cause of these unequal outcomes, or whether the differences result
4primarily from unequal qualifications and creditworthiness.  The vast majority of empirical
work on racial and ethnic differences in underwriting is based on HMDA data, which do
not contain many critical lender and loan attributes such as credit history, the ratio of the
loan amount to the property’s assessed value, or the ratio of housing expenses to the
borrower’s income.  The most recent and high profile study that controls for detailed
underwriting variables, Munnell et. al. for the Boston market in 1990, was highly
controversial, with some follow-up studies confirming its findings (Ross and Yinger,
1999; Carr and Megbolugbe, 1993) while others raised doubts about the conclusions
(Horne, 1997; Day and Liebowitz, 1998).  Finally, recent analyses by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson, 2000; Stengel and
Glennon, 1999) find less widespread evidence of discrimination when estimating
underwriting models for individual lenders.1
Paired testing provides a powerful tool for investigating adverse and differential
treatment of racial and ethnic minorities.2  Following the paired test methodology, two
individuals, one white and one minority, can pose as homebuyers and inquire about the
availability and terms for home mortgage loans.  Because the two members of a tester
team present themselves as equally qualified borrowers in every respect except their
race or ethnicity, systematic differences in the treatment they receive provides direct
evidence of disparate treatment by mortgage lenders.3   Furthermore, evidence provided
by paired testing can be viewed as complementary to traditional regression studies
because it can capture forms of discrimination that are not accessible through
administrative data.  This key advantage of paired testing has been cited in a recent
panel and earlier workshop sponsored by the National Resource Council, Blank,
Dabady, and Citro (2004) and Foster, Mitchell, and Fienberg (2002).4
It is important to note that paired testing by design is required to focus on early
stages of the market transaction.  In the case of the mortgage market, this requirement
5implies that testing focus on the behavior of loan officers during the pre-application stage
of the mortgage transaction.  Disparate treatment during this stage is illegal under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),5 but such tests cannot directly test for disparate
treatment in the approval of mortgage applications, which may be of greater policy
significance than illegal behavior during the pre-application stage.6
Nonetheless, a number of existing studies suggest that loan officers can
influence the eventual outcome of a mortgage application potentially leading to greater
racial disparities in underwriting.  Temkin, Levy, and Levine (1999) examine a medium-
sized mortgage lender that has an explicit policy of including the loan officer, who knows
the race of the applicant, in the underwriting decision for problem applications.7  Squires
and Kim (1999) merge employment information from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission with HMDA data and find that the approval rates of African-American
applicants rise as the share of African-American employees at the lender increases.8
Finally, Yezer, Phillips, and Trost (1994) and Ross and Yinger (1999) find evidence of a
simultaneity between loan application attributes and a lender’s underwriting standards.
As in the case study, a likely way for race to influence how loan applications respond to
lender underwriting standards is through the loan officer since underwriters rarely meet
applicants.9
In addition, disparate treatment by loan officers may discourage minority
applicants who as a result never submit an application or seek higher cost financing in
the subprime market.  Specifically, discrimination may weaken minority borrowers’
attachment to formal financial markets, and borrowers with low levels of such attachment
are the primary users of the subprime market (Carr and Schuetz, 2001).  In fact, many
users of the subprime market are qualified for financing in the primary market
(FreddieMac, 2000), and these borrowers on average pay a substantial premium above
what they would have paid in the prime market (Lax, Manti, Raca and Zorn, 2000).
6While the paired testing methodology has been widely applied to study housing
market (Ross and Turner, In press; Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger, 2003; Yinger, 1987) and
employment discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark, 1996; Kenny
and Wissoker, 1994), only a few, enforcement-oriented testing efforts have been
conducted in the mortgage market.10  Specifically, in the early 1990s, the National Fair
Housing Alliance (NFHA) conducted tests in seven cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas,
Denver, Detroit, Oakland, and Richmond (Smith and Cloud, 1996) and a local fair
housing group conducted tests in Philadelphia (Lawton, 1996).  In both cases, testers
posed as first-time homebuyers and refinancers inquiring about financing terms and
conditions at the pre-application stage.  A reanalysis of the NFHA testing data found that
minorities were less likely to receive information about loan products, received less time
and information from loan officers, and were quoted higher interest rates in most of the
cities where tests were conducted (Delair and Smith, 1999).
This paper analyzes data from a pilot paired testing study of mortgage lending
institutions that was funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and conducted by the Urban Institute in the spring and summer of 2000.11  This
study recorded the treatment of minority testers posing as first-time homebuyers with
limited assets and their comparable white teammates when they visited mortgage
lending institutions in Chicago and Los Angeles to make pre-application inquiries.  While
the results cannot be generalized to the entire population of minority homebuyers, the
study’s focus on first time, downpayment constrained homebuyers targets a group that is
likely to be dependent upon pre-application assistance, and as such this study captures
behaviors that may pose a significant barrier to minority homeownership.
The paper is organized as follows:  section 2 describes the paired testing
methodology and the data generated by this study, section 3 describes the empirical
methodologies used to measure and test for differential treatment of minorities and to
7examine how such treatment varies across lenders, section 4 presents empirical
evidence concerning the extent and pattern of racial and ethnic differences in treatment,
and the final section briefly summarizes the paper’s contributions and findings.
Paired Testing Methodology and Data
This study involves approximately 250 paired tests of a representative sample of
mortgage lending institutions in Los Angeles, California and Chicago, Illinois
(approximately 75 tests per group in each site).  These tests followed a single,
standardized set of protocols in order to yield statistically rigorous measures of
differential treatment of African Americans and Hispanics relative to whites in the two
metropolitan housing markets.  Specifically, testers posing as first-time homebuyers with
limited assets visited mortgage lending institutions to make a general, uninformed
request for information about how much house they could afford and what loan products
might be available to them.
All of the testers were assigned financial profiles that qualified them for products
targeted to borrowers with A- credit quality in their respective housing markets.  Each
tester was randomly assigned one of six fictitious credit history profiles containing one or
two minor credit blemishes, usually a late payment of some kind.   The testers were
assigned income and asset levels sufficient to purchase a median-priced house in their
metropolitan area, assuming a 30-year conventional fixed-rate loan at a market specific
interest rate and a 5 percent downpayment.  The two members of each tester pair were
given virtually identical financial and household characteristics, with the minority partner
always slightly better qualified than the white.
The financial profiles were designed to make the testers downpayment
constrained in terms of the loan amount for which they could qualify rather than being
constrained by their income or debt levels.12   For a specific tester pair, the target house
price was chosen randomly from an interval around the market median house price,
8$175,000 to $190,000 for Chicago and $275,000 to $300,000 for Los Angeles.13  Cash
assets required were calculated as the sum of the 5 percent downpayment and closing
costs, which were based on loan amount and evidence from a pre-test phase
respectively.  Total housing expenses were calculated as the sum of interest and
principle payments plus private mortgage insurance, homeowners insurance, and
property taxes.14  The other expenses were estimated based on standard, publicly
available data sources.  Financial variables were set to match key financial ratios, and
included small amounts of random variation in order to avoid detection by loan officers.15
Testers were matched by local testing staff on gender, age, and general
appearance.  These matches were not permanent, but rather testers could be paired
with multiple partners if multiple testers were available with the same gender,
comparable age, and broadly similar appearance.  Finally, in the case of Hispanic-Anglo
tests, Hispanic testers were allowed to have an accent, but were required to be fluent in
both spoken and written English.  Previous paired testing studies that have imposed this
standard have found little evidence that accent leads to treatment differences between
Hispanic testers (Yinger, 1995; Kenny and Wissoker, 1994).
In both Chicago and Los Angeles, testers visited a representative sample of
mortgage lending institutions in the metropolitan area that reported under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),16 accepted at least 90 mortgage loan applications in
the market in 1998, and had offices in the region that a first-time homebuyer could
realistically find and visit.17  Based on these criteria, the population of qualifying lenders
included 67 institutions in Chicago and 106 institutions in Los Angeles.  The population
of eligible lenders represented 56% and 62% of the total HMDA-reported application
volume in the Chicago and Los Angeles markets, respectively (see Table 1).18
In order to draw a market representative sample, lenders were selected with
replacement and with a probability of selection based on loan volume.  Lending
9institutions with very large application volumes not only had a high probability of
selection, but were likely to appear in the sample more than once.  This sampling
strategy allows us to draw conclusions about the incidence of differential treatment by
large lending institutions in Chicago and Los Angeles that are representative of the
pattern of lending in the marketplace. In the Los Angeles metropolitan area, 35 lenders
were selected for black-white testing and 34 were selected for Hispanic-Anglo testing,
and in Chicago 49 lenders were selected for black-white testing and 51 were selected for
Hispanic-Anglo testing.   For both markets and racial/ethnic groups, the lenders selected
accounted for approximately half of the application activity captured in HMDA data.
Table 2 shows the effect of the lender selection process on market
representativeness in terms of the share of loan applications made to depository
lenders, as well as the racial and ethnic composition of loan applications.  In Los
Angeles, the sample of eligible lenders is drawn more heavily from depository lenders
rather than mortgage banks with the percent of applications to depository lenders
increasing from 43 to 59 percent, but the selection process did not have a large effect on
racial and ethnic composition.  In Chicago, the sample of eligible lenders receives a
somewhat smaller share of African-American loan applications than the full sample, 11
rather than 15 percent.  These differences suggest that the walk-in protocol used in this
study may not represent the market wide incidence of differential treatment, but
nonetheless captures the experiences of a sizable set of potential minority borrowers.
While the sample was drawn based on lending institutions, each test was
conducted by visiting an individual branch office, which was randomly selected from all
of the institution’s local offices. 19  To select a branch office for a test, a list of the target
lender’s local branches was compiled.  Urban institute staff made calls to local offices to
verify addresses and determine which branches potential borrowers could visit to receive
information on mortgage loans.  Once the list of local branches was reduced to those
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providing mortgage information, the branch to be tested was selected randomly from the
list.
The testing protocols that testers followed when conducting a test can be
summarized in five basic steps.
• Step #1 - Obtain an Appointment.  All testers called to arrange “in person”
visits with lenders following detailed and uniform instructions.
• Step #2 - Make the Initial Request.  At their appointments, testers were
instructed to very clearly request (up to three times, if necessary) help in figuring
out a price range of housing that they might be able to afford and an estimated
loan amount for which they might qualify.
• Step #3 - Exchange Personal/Financial Information.  Testers were trained
to be forthcoming and provide detailed information on income, debts, assets,
credit history, as well as other personal and financial characteristics when
requested by a lender.20
• Step #4 - Record Information on Financing Options Recommended.  Testers
were required to take notes and record information provided by the lender such
as suggested home price range, an estimated loan amount, and details about
any financing options recommended.
• Step #5 - End the Visit.  Testers were instructed to thank the lender for
any assistance and allow the lender to suggest any follow-up contact.
Following every test visit, testers completed a Test Report Form that recorded
their responses to specific questions about the test experience and the information that
was provided by the lender.21  Testers were instructed to complete all forms as soon as
possible following contact with a lender and were not allowed to discuss their
11
experiences with their testing partner.  Testers completed the forms based on their
recollection of what occurred during the test and on notes taken and materials obtained
during the test.22
Even at the pre-application stage, inquiries about mortgage products and terms
are complicated interactions and differences in treatment can take many forms.  As a
result, the study gather treatment information on six major questions about the
information and assistance that lending institutions provided:23
1) Did testers receive the information they requested about loan amounts and
house prices they could afford?
2) How much were testers told they could afford to borrow and/or buy?
3) How many specific products were discussed with the tester?
4) How much “coaching”, such as offers of advice on paying down debts,
downpayment assistance, or a prequalification letter, did testers receive to help
them qualify for a loan?
5) Did testers receive follow-up calls from lenders?
6) Were testers encouraged to consider FHA loans as an option?
During the study design, researchers defined specific hypotheses concerning
findings that would be interpreted as adverse treatment of minority testers.  For the first
three questions, these hypotheses are straightforward.  Specifically, minorities are
assumed to have experienced adverse treatment if they receive less information overall,
are told that they are qualified for a smaller loan, or are told about fewer products than
their white partners.  The test scenario instructs testers to be persistent in requesting
information on obtaining a loan, and failure to satisfy the minority tester’s request is
naturally interpreted as negative treatment.  Similarly, being provided detailed
12
information on multiple loan products or quoted a higher loan amount provides a benefit
to the borrower by increasing his or her financial options.
Although some researchers have questions about what constitutes unfavorable
treatment on the remaining three questions, these hypotheses reflect current thinking in
the mortgage lending literature.  While some forms of coaching (such as being told to
pay down debt) might be interpreted negatively by minority homebuyers, the standard
view in the fair lending literature is that assistance in paying down debts or obtaining a
downpayment increases the likelihood of an application being approved and therefore
constitutes favorable treatment (Yinger, 1996; Siskin and Cupingood, 1996).  Similarly,
even though excessive follow-up by a loan officer might be viewed negatively by some
homebuyers, receiving follow-up contact reflects marketing effort and an eagerness to
do business, and therefore is considered favorable treatment, as has been the case in
every previous paired testing study.  Finally, being encouraged to pursue FHA financing
is viewed as negative treatment because FHA financing is substantially more expensive
than conventional financing and an on-going policy question has been whether minority
borrowers are disproportionately steered to FHA financing (Bradford and Shlay, 1996).24
Even if a reader is somewhat skeptical about these specific interpretations, all of
the results presented below can be interpreted as differential treatment of equally
qualified individuals seeking assistance and advice on obtaining a home mortgage.
Given the careful pairing of testers on assigned financial characteristics and the fact that
the testers approach the same lender following a common protocol, differential treatment
can reasonably be attributed to the race or ethnicity of the testers.  In order to be
conservative, all hypothesis tests presented are conducted as two sided tests, which is
consistent with imposing no assumptions concerning whether a type of treatment is
favorable or unfavorable.
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Statistical Analysis Methodology
Each paired test typically generates data on a series of treatments t that are
experienced by the majority and minority testers and recorded as Wit and Mit.  Incidence
measures are developed by comparing the treatment of the two testers in each test i and
classifying the test as being majority favored, equal treatment, or minority favored.
Gross majority or minority favored treatment is defined as the fraction of tests classified
as majority or minority favored, respectively, and the net measure of adverse treatment
is defined as gross majority favored treatment minus gross minority favored treatment.
Specifically,
]0Pr[]0Pr[ <−−>−= ititititt MWMWN (1)
where the probability (Pr) is captured by the sample frequency and treatments are
initialized so that a large value is interpreted as positive treatment.  Similarly, a severity
measure for a treatment is defined as the difference in the treatment experienced by the
two testers or
][ ititt MWES −= (2)
where the expected value is captured by the sample mean of the difference or a
weighted mean if pooling tests across a stratified sample.
Net incidence and severity measures are often interpreted as estimates of
systematic discrimination against minorities.  If one assumes that white Anglos rarely
experience systematic adverse treatment, then all cases of minority-favored treatment
can be interpreted as random differences in treatment, unrelated to race or ethnicity.  If
this assumption is correct, then by subtracting cases of minority-favored treatment from
the cases of white-favored treatment, the net incidence measure removes the element of
random error and reflects the true incidence of discrimination against minorities.
However, if the assumption is incorrect (and systematic discrimination against white
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Anglos does sometimes occur), then the net measure may actually understate the
incidence of discrimination against minorities.25
In the analysis presented here, the gross incidence and the mean treatment
experienced for continuous variables are reported by both majority and minority testers.
Statistical tests for differential treatment are then conducted to determine whether the
net incidence or severity arising from the differences of majority and minority treatment
systematically differ from zero using a two sided test.26 Even though earlier language
refers to favorable or adverse treatment, the two-sided test provides a more
conservative test for differential treatment, which does not rely on specific interpretations
of favorable versus unfavorable treatment.
Due to small sample sizes, conventional tests based on the normal distribution or
asymptotic relationships may be biased, and we follow the suggestion of Heckman and
Siegelman (1993) to use Fisher’s exact (permutation) tests.  In the case of incidence
data, the null hypothesis may be written as
H0t: 5.0]0|0Pr[ =≠−>− itititit MWMW (3)
The null hypothesis in equation (3) leads to the standard sign test, which can be formally
written as
∑
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where Dt is the difference in the number of white and minority favored tests, DtM is the
total number of tests with differential treatment of some form, DtC is the critical statistic
for a 5 percent chance of a type I error where the null hypothesis of differential treatment
is rejected if Dt or DtM minus Dt is greater than or equal to that statistic, and
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which is simply the number of permutations where Dt ones are observed in DtM binary
variables divided by the total number of permutations for DtM binary variables.
In the case of severity measures, the null hypothesis may be written as
H0t: 0][ =− itit MWE (6)
The null hypothesis in equation (6) is tested using the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  As
with the sign test, the Wilcoxon signed rank test is simply the application of a standard
permutation test for ranks after conditioning on differential treatment.  Specifically, the
difference between white and minority treatment is calculated for tests where this
difference is zero and absolute differences are ordered from largest to smallest in order
to assign ranks.  The signed rank statistic is the sum of ranks from all pairs that are
consistent with differential treatment, and the critical statistic is obtained as in equation
(4) by summing permutation based probabilities of observing rank sums above some
threshold.  See Agresti (1990) and Ramsey and Schafer (1997) for detailed
presentations of the sign and Wilcoxon signed rank tests.
Multiple Testing Environment
By its nature, paired testing represents an attempt to assess a complex set of
personal interactions and so typically surveys a wide variety of treatment variables.  In
this study, results are presented for six classes of treatment and a large number of
individual variables covering four different samples of tests, two groups tested in each of
two sites.  This large number of tests raises the question of whether some or all of the
statistically significant results presented below represent an incorrect rejection of the null
hypothesis of equal treatment, a type I error.
A common approach to control for multiple tests is a Bonferroni correction where
the simple version involves multiplying the likelihood of a type I error by number of
hypothesis tests conducted (Shaffer, 1995).  This correction is appropriate for
16
considering the type I error associated with a single statistically significant finding that
has been taken from a larger set of tests.  In this case, however, the analysis of a
sample of tests may yield multiple findings that are consistent with differential treatment
by race or ethnicity.  The overall pattern of differential treatment observed may have
been highly unlikely to arise by chance even if individual findings are statistically
insignificant after applying the Bonferroni correction.
In our opinion, the appropriate null hypothesis for differential treatment is that
differential treatment was not identified on any treatment variables considered or
H0s:  T1s=0 and T2s=0 and T3s=0 and … TKs=0 (7)
where Tks is the kth test for differential treatment that is zero when the individual null is
maintained and K is the total number of tests conducted for a sample s.  Under the null
hypothesis, Tks is a binary variable (Bernoulli) that takes the value one with a probability
of 0.05, the likelihood of a type I error.  The K hypotheses form a multinomial variable,
and the cumulative probability distribution of the multinomial distribution can be used to
calculate the likelihood of rejecting the null of equal treatment in the sample. 27
Specifically,
∑ ∑
= =
>

 =
C
sT
t
K
k
k tT
0 1
95.0Pr (8)
where TsC is the number of individual findings of differential treatment necessary to reject
the null with a type I error rate of 0.05, and
tKt
tKt
Kt −−= )95.0()05.0()!(!
!]Pr[ (9)
Of course, a full set of hypothesis tests are conducted for four samples of tests,
two groups in each of two sites.  In this case, a Bonferroni correction is completely
appropriate since a finding of differential treatment for one group in either site will be
highlighted as evidence that either race or ethnicity affects the process of mortgage
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lending in that market regardless of the findings for the other group or in the other
market.   Since these four samples are independent, the simple Bonferroni correction
can be applied where the likelihood of a type I error for each sample is multiplied by four
(Shaffer, 1995), and the 0.95 in equation (8) must be replaced with 0.9875.
In order to focus on a more parsimonious set of tests, the paper examines the six
overall forms of treatment:  provision of information, loan amount, number of products,
coaching, recommendation of FHA, and follow-up contact.  Due to the presentation of
both incidence and severity measures, two tests were conducted for many of these
treatments, and in order to be conservative we only count a treatment as a finding of
differential treatment when equal treatment was rejected with no more than a 0.05 type I
error rate for both the severity and the incidence measure.  The resulting likelihood of
rejecting one or more, two or more, three or more, or four or more of the six hypotheses
under the null hypothesis is 0.2649, 0.0328, 0.0022, and 0.0001. After applying the
Bonferroni correction, we conclude that a significant finding of differential treatment for
three and four of the six null hypotheses for a given sample of tests allows us to reject
the null of no differential treatment with a 0.01 and a 0.0005 type I error rate,
respectively.
Tester Heterogeneity
Any paired testing effort involves taking a naturally heterogenous group of people
(testers) and training them to follow a common protocol and act in very similar ways
during their test visits.  Insufficient training or supervision, or a vague protocol may allow
individual testers to behave differently during their visits, potentially creating differences
in treatment that are unrelated to race.  Heckman and Siegelman (1993) examined the
tester pairs used in an employment discrimination study by the Urban Institute. For one
of the four samples, Heckman and Siegelman rejected the null hypothesis of equal
differential treatment across tester pairs suggesting that tester identity influences
18
treatment.28  Alternatively, Turner, Ross, Galster, and Yinger (2002) examined the effect
of actual tester attributes, such as education and income,29 on differential treatment and
found that these attributes influenced treatment even though this information was not
directly available to the real estate agent.  They also found, however, that controlling for
these differences had little effect on or in some cases even increased the estimated
incidence of adverse treatment.
This paper assesses tester heterogeneity following a method similar to Heckman
and Siegelman (1993) where contingency tables were created to test whether treatment
differed systematically across tester pairs.  Unlike Heckman, however, this study used a
relatively large number of testers, Chicago tests used between 9 and 12 testers for each
group and the Los Angeles tests used between 6 and 7,30 and the testers were not
paired sometimes conducting tests with multiple partners.  Therefore, contingency tables
are created that describe the pattern of treatment outcomes for individual testers, and for
each sample twelve tables are created representing the pattern of treatment for majority
and minority testers for each of the six overall treatments.31
In order to limit the problems associated with empty and near-empty cells, all
testers who conducted only one or two tests are dropped from the sample, and the
treatment variables considered are constructed to have only two possible outcomes (1/0)
for each tester.  The resulting contingency tables are 2xJ where J is the total number of
testers of a given race or ethnicity in a sample of tests.  The detailed variable
construction is described prior to presenting the results of the heterogeneity tests.  In
spite of these provisions, many cells have small sizes, and a Fisher’s exact test is used
to test for table homogeneity. The specific test used here is a test for homogeneity
across the rows of the table, which is typically conducted using a Chi-square test with
larger cell populations, and the distribution of permutations is described by the multiple
hypergeometric distribution, see Agresti (1990).
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The specific null hypothesis tested is
H0:  ]|Pr[],|Pr[ sWsjW itti j =  and ]|Pr[],|Pr[ sMsjM itti j = (10)
for all testers j and all treatment variables t.  Specifically, the hypotheses that treatment
probabilities are the same for all majority or for all minority testers in a sample is tested
via the group and treatment specific homogeneity tests, and the application of this test to
both majority and minority testers for six treatment variables gives rise to the twelve
tables referred to above.
Accordingly, a multinomial distribution of 12 Bernoulli variables is used to
calculate the likelihood of observing a specific number of heterogeneity findings or more
for any sample of tests under the null hypothesis of homogeneous testers, see equations
(8) and (9).  The resulting likelihood of a type I error is then multiplied by four due to the
four samples considered in order to obtain a significance level.  In order to be aggressive
in identifying heterogeneity (conservative in interpreting the core findings), multiple
significance level thresholds are examined, and a pool of testers are presumed
heterogenous if the overall null hypothesis of homogeneity can be rejected based on the
number of individual hypothesis test rejection for any of following the significance
thresholds:  0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, or 0.001.
Multivariate Analysis
While the test scenario was the same for all tests, the lenders visited exhibited
considerable heterogeneity.  This section describes our attempts to examine how
differential treatment varied across lenders. In order to increase the efficiency of
estimates, we restrict the treatment of majority testers to be the same in the same site m
regardless of the minority group involved in testing, i.e. the specific sample s.  We also
start with a linear model for all treatments whether the underlying variable is discrete,
ordinal, or continuous.  Specifically,
20
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ZXW εδξβα ++++= (11)
where XWism represent test attributes that are unique to the majority tester’s visit, such as
the race of the agent encountered; Zism represents attributes of test i in sample s in site
m that are invariant across visits, primarily attributes of the lender visited; αWtm and βWtm
describe the relationship between visit and test attributes and the treatment of the
majority tester on treatment variable t, which vary only across sites; δitsm represents a
test fixed effect; ξjsm is the fixed effect associated with tester j, and εWitsm captures
random events that arose during a tester’s visit.  Similarly, minority treatment is modeled
as
MitsmitsmsmjismMtsmMismMtsmitsm Mi
ZXM εδξβα ++++= (12)
where the key difference between equations (11) and (12) is that the parameters α and β
are indexed by the minority group tested and the tester j is identified as the minority
tester for test i in equation (12).
Tester fixed effects are eliminated by mean differencing equations (11) and (12)
by the identity of the majority or minority tester, respectively.  This model is estimated
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  MacKinnon and White (1985) show, however, that
the traditional heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator may provide
seriously biased standard error estimates in small samples.  Horowitz (2000) raises
similar concerns about pairwise bootstrap estimation in small samples.  Mammen (1993)
and Flachaire (1999, In Press) all suggest either applying the HC2 or HC3 correction to
the traditional pairwise bootstrap and/or shifting to a wild bootstrap procedure.
Accordingly, consistent standard errors and F-statistics are generated using a
wild bootstrap with the HC2 correction.32  Specifically, 10,000 bootstrap samples are
generated using the following specification for the dependent variable in each bootstrap
sample b:
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where i is a randomly chosen observation from the sample s in site m, ltsmYˆ  is the
predicted value of )( ltsmltsm MW − based on the OLS estimates obtained from mean
differenced versions of equations (11) and (12), ϖitsmb is a random normal variable with
mean zero and variance one drawn separately for each treatment, observation, and
bootstrap sample. ltsmεˆ  is the predicted residual or the difference between
)( ltsmltsm MW −  and ltsmYˆ , and
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which is often referred to as the leverage of the observation.  Formally, one minus hlsm is
the variance of the predicted residual for observation i.
An additional analysis is conducted to mitigate the impact of test fixed effects.
Specifically, majority and minority mean differenced equations are differenced to yield
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where the bar above a variable indicates a tester mean differenced variable and the
superscipt on the mean differenced test fixed effect indicates whether the effect was
mean differenced based on the white or minority tester identity.  This differencing does
not completely eliminate the influence of test fixed effects.  Specifically,
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Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons to believe that any bias arising from
test unobservables will be mitigated by the use of equation (15).  First, since pairs of
testers are assigned to randomly selected advertisements, the mean test effects in
equation (16) should limit to zero as the number of tests conducted by each tester
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increases.  The average number of tests per tester is about seven and ten in Chicago
and Los Angeles, respectively. Second, equation (16) equals zero if majority and
minority testers are always paired with the same teammate.  Even though this project did
not use fixed pairs of testers, testers were often assigned to the same partner due to
schedules, matching on age and gender, and habit, which should further reduce the
influence of test fixed effects in equation (15).
Before concluding this section, we believe that it is important to discuss our
choice of the linear model over non-linear maximum likelihood estimators like the logit,
probit or ordered probit.  The linear model offers two important advantages.  First, the
model allows for a simple approach for eliminating test fixed effects that is consistent
across all dependent variables considered in our analysis.  Second, our bootstrap
estimating procedure is both supported by existing research on the linear model and
facilitated by the computational advantages of that model.  On the other hand, the
consistency advantage typically offered by non-linear models is lost in the context of
both the small sample size and the potentially complex error structure in our data.
Empirical Results
The first three treatment variables considered refer directly to the information
requested in the testing protocols, and the results are shown in Table 3.   The table
presents both incidence indicators that represent the frequency with which the white or
majority tester is favored over their minority partner or visa versa, as well as severity
indicators that present the average experience of both the white and minority tester.  The
significance tests for whether these frequencies or averages differ between the white
and minority tester are recorded in the minority favored column as # for significance at
the 10% level, * for significance at the 5% level and ** for significance at the 1% level or
better.  This discussion focuses primarily on findings significant at the 5% level or better.
23
The results for whether testers received the information that they requested are
shown in the first five rows under incidence indicators.  These contain the frequency of
white or minority favored tests for whether the tester was provided with a loan amount, a
house price, specific product options, or exchanged financial details with the loan
officers, as well as an index (0-4) that is based on the four treatment variables.  The
index scores a tester’s treatment as lowest possible treatment if no house price or loan
amount is provided reflecting the design of the testing scenario where the tester
repeatedly requested a loan amount or house price that would be affordable.  The next
lowest score arises if only a loan amount and/or house price is provided, and higher
scores reflect the provision of additional information on products or the exchange of
additional financial details.33  Focusing on row 5, significant differences in treatment
based on the information provided index are found for black-white tests in Chicago and
Hispanic-Anglo tests in Los Angeles with 16 and 13 percentage point differences
between white and minority favored treatment, respectively.  The row that follows shows
samples sizes for each minority group tested in each site.
The next four rows contain the incidence of differential treatment on the loan
amount or house price provided to the tester, as well as sample sizes for these
comparisons.  A test is considered white-favored if the white tester was provided an
estimated loan amount or house price that is five percent above the value provided to
the minority tester, and similarly minority-favored tests arise when the value provided to
the white tester is five percent below the minority tester’s value.  Significant differences
are found for both loan amount and house price for Hispanic-Anglo tests in Chicago with
31 and 35 percentage point differences, respectively.  Severity tests are also significant
for this same set of tests, and the differences in values quoted white and Hispanic
testers are $16,600 for loan amount and $16,100 for house price.  Note that the sample
sizes are smaller than in the information provided rows because comparisons were only
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made if both testers received a loan amount or house price based on the testers’
financial characteristics.34
The final treatment variable considered in this table is the provision of information
on specific loan products.  Specifically, the incidence indicator captures whether the
white or minority tester was provided information on more products than his or her
partner, and the severity indicator compares the number of products discussed with
each tester.  For the incidence measure, significant differences of 24 percentage points
are found for black-white and Hispanic-Anglo tests in Chicago.  For the severity
measures, significant differences are found for black-white tests in Chicago and for
Hispanic-Anglo tests in both Los Angeles and Chicago with differences between 0.3 and
0.4 products shown on average.  Note that the definition for whether a product is
discussed is fairly rigid, requiring that the product be considered with reference to the
individual’s own financial details.  Naturally, products cannot be discussed at this level of
detail unless financial details are exchanged.  Therefore, tests are only considered if
both testers exchanged financial details; to do otherwise would double count differential
treatment that was found in the received information variables.
The first seven rows of table 4 (under incidence indicators) contains the results
for the six coaching variables considered:  discussions on paying down debts,
discussions on debt consolidation, downpayment assistance, seller assistance, pre-
qualification letter, and offer of a homebuying seminar; as well as an indicator for
whether the white or minority tester received coaching on a larger number of items than
his or her partner.  Focusing on the final row (more coaching), significant differences of
25, 21, and 24 percentage points were found for Hispanic-Anglo and black-white tests in
Chicago, and black-white tests in Los Angeles, respectively.  The provision of
downpayment assistance appears central to this finding for all three sites while pre-
qualification and seller assistance may play some role for tests in Chicago.  The severity
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indicators are also statistically significant for these three sets of tests, and the
differences in coaching fell between 0.3 and 0.5 types of coaching being provided.
Table 4 also presents the results for whether testers received follow-up contact
and whether FHA was encouraged or discouraged.  The incidence measure for follow-up
captures whether one tester received at least one follow-up contact while his or her
partner did not, and the severity measure compares the average number contacts
received by white and minority testers.35  Significant differences in follow-up contact are
found only for black-white tests in Chicago where incidence differences are 11
percentage points and severity differences are 0.2 contacts.  No significance differences
in treatment are found for the FHA variables.
Statistical Significance with Multiple Tests
The pattern of findings above are summarized in Table 5, which shows the
significance level for estimated differential treatment for each of the six broad treatment
categories with the levels for specific variables listed in the order presented in Tables 3
and 4.  At the bottom of the table, the number of findings at the 0.05 significance level is
summarized for each sample where findings are not counted if any variables for a given
treatment category are not statistically significant.  In Chicago, Significant differential
treatment is observed for three and four of the treatment categories for Anglo-Hispanic
and black-white tests, respectively, leading to a rejection of the null of equal treatment
with only a 0.01 and 0.001 chance of type I error.  Differential treatment is rejected for
only one of the six treatments for both samples in Los Angeles, and the overall pattern of
treatment in Los Angeles is consistent with the null hypothesis of equal treatment of
majority and minority testers.
The reader should also note that all findings of differential treatment in Chicago
are in the direction that had an a priori interpretion as differential treatment of minority
borrowers.  Hispanics were quoted lower loan amounts, provided less information on
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specific loan products, and received less assistance or coaching than white testers.
Similarly, African-Americans were less likely to receive the specific information
requested, provided less information on specific loan products, received less assistance
or coaching than white testers, and were less likely to experience follow-up contact from
the lender.  This pattern reinforces our conclusion that systematic differences exist
between the treatment experienced by minorities and whites during the pre-application
phase of applying for a mortgage.36
Some readers may feel that we are being too conservative in interpreting the
results in Los Angeles.  For example, in the Anglo-Hispanic sample, differential
treatment on number of products shown is statistically significant for the severity
measure, which contains more information than the incidence variable.  Even if we
include this finding, however, there are still only two findings of differential treatment for
the sample, and such a pattern still cannot be distinguished statistically from equal
treatment.37
In our opinion, the key finding in Los Angeles that deserves additional
consideration is differential treatment on the coaching variable for black-white tests.  The
coaching differences in terms of severity, as well as the incidence on downpayment
assistance individually, are highly significant for this sample of tests, better than 0.002
and 0.0001 significance levels.  Moreover, a simple Bonferroni correction to the
significance level of downpayment assistance (multiplying by 92 for the total number of
tests in Tables 2 and 3) yields a significance level of 0.01.  Therefore, even after
considering the multiple testing environment, statistically significant differences in the
provision of downpayment assistance have been found in three of the four samples of
tests, suggesting that racial and ethnic differences on this form of loan officer behavior
may be fairly widespread.
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Tester Heterogeneity
As discussed earlier, this paper assesses tester heterogeneity following a
method similar to Heckman and Siegelman (1993).  The six specific treatment variables
are constructed as follows:  the information provided variable is 1 if either the tester is
provided a loan amount or house price and financial details are exchanged,38 the loan
amount variable is 1 if the loan amount provided by the loan officer is above the average
value for all testers in a sample of tests, the product information variable is 1 if the tester
is told about two or more products, the coaching variable is 1 if downpayment assistance
was offered, the follow-up variable is 1 if any follow-up contact is made, the FHA variable
is 1 if FHA was encouraged, and all variables are set to zero otherwise.39
The results of the heterogeneity analysis are shown in Table 6.  For each
treatment variable, the row shows the confidence with which the null hypothesis of
homogeneous testers can be rejected, and the row below shows the sample size.40  The
last row in the top panel of the table shows the number of testers in each sample.  The
second panel of rows shows the number of heterogeneity findings for each sample of
tests for each standard of significance considered.
For black-white tests in Los Angeles, tester homogeneity is rejected at the 5%
significance level using both the 0.01 and 0.001 significance level thresholds, and for
Hispanic-Anglo tests in Chicago tester homogeneity is rejected based on the 0.1
threshold.  For black-white tests in Chicago and Hispanic-Anglo tests in Los Angeles,
there is no evidence of tester heterogeneity.  These findings imply that behavioral
differences between testers of the same race lead to systematic differences in treatment
between those testers in two of the samples.  More crucially, if behavioral differences
between testers of the same race affect relative treatment in those samples, similar
differences between the white and minority testers may affect differential treatment, and
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there is no way to determine whether these behavioral differences vary systematically by
race or ethnicity in the samples of testers.
In terms of interpreting the previous findings of differential treatment, this analysis
supports the finding of differential treatment of African-Americans in Chicago, but raises
some questions about the finding for Hispanics in Chicago.  In spite of these concerncs,
however, we believe that the finding of differential treatment of Hispanics in Chicago is
still quite important.  The only study that has quantified the influence of tester attributes
on treatment (Turner, Ross, Galster, and Yinger, 2002) found that in most cases
controlling for tester attributes has no influence on differential treatment and when
attribute differences affected differential treatment they tended to improve outcomes for
minorities biasing analyses away from finding discrimination.  Moreover, these findings
represent real differences in treatment between testers who are equally qualified, visit
the same firm, and make the same request.  Differences in treatment that have an
adverse impact on minorities must by law satisfy a business necessity standard that is
unlikely to include responses to minor behavioral differences that have no connection to
the lender’s business goals.41
Exploring Variation across Lenders
A multivariate analysis is conducted for each of the six major treatment variables
presented in Tables 3 and 4.  In terms of detailed loan information we examine the
determinants of the information provided index, the loan amount quoted by the loan
officer, and the number of products discussed.  Additional treatments considered include
whether follow-up contact was made, whether the tester was encouraged to consider
FHA financing, and number of types of coaching provided, as well as whether coaching
on downpayment assistance was provided since this specific form of coaching appeared
important for three of the four samples.
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Table 7 presents the mean and standard errors for visit and lender attributes.
The four columns represent the four samples of tests over two sites and two minority
groups.  The first four rows present the frequency with which the majority and minority
testers in each sample encountered African-American or Hispanic loan officers.  As
expected, the representation of Hispanics among loan officers is substantially higher in
Los Angeles than Chicago, but there is no evidence to suggest that black or Hispanic
testers were more likely to encounter minority agents.  The last four rows present the
average lender share of African-American and Hispanic applications, average the
number of loans in the market made by each lender in 1999, and the representation of
depository lenders in each sample.  The share of applications from Hispanic borrowers
is obviously higher in Los Angeles.  In addition, the lenders are larger on average and
are less likely to be depository lenders.  The final row contains the sample sizes.
Table 8 contains the estimates for the treatment models in Chicago controlling for
tester fixed effects.  Each column contains the estimates for a specific treatment
variable.  The first six rows present the coefficients that describe the treatment of white
testers.  The second and third sets of rows present the racial and ethnic differences in
treatment, respectively.  The last four rows present the F-statistics for each model
(white, racial difference, and ethnic difference) and the sample size.
In Chicago, three of the seven white models and three of the fourteen racial and
ethnic difference models are statistically significant at varying levels of confidence.
However, given the large number of hypothesis tests conducted, we focus on behavioral
relationships that are consistent across a variety of treatments.  In terms of the treatment
of white testers, African-American loan officers provide applicants more coaching, are
more likely to make follow-up contact, and more likely to encourage FHA financing,
which is viewed as a high cost form of financing.  Lenders with a higher share of black
applicants are less likely to provide the requested information, provide information about
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fewer products, less coaching, and less likely to initiate follow-up contact, but are more
likely to encourage the applicant to consider FHA financing.  Finally, larger lenders (in
terms of number of loans originated) provide less coaching concerning down payment
assistance, are less likely to make follow-up contact, but again more likely to encourage
FHA financing.
These same variables appear important in terms of the relative treatment of black
and Hispanic testers.  In fact, the pattern of findings often mirrors the white coefficients.
Hispanic testers encountering African-American loan officers receive less coaching
including less downpayment assistance and are less likely to receive follow-up contact
relative to the treatment experienced by white testers.  Black testers visiting lenders with
a high share of black applicants are provided information on more products, more
coaching including downpayment assistance, more likely to receive follow-up contact,
and less likely to be encouraged to apply of FHA financing.  In addition, Black and
Hispanic testers visiting large lenders receive higher loan amounts (Hispanic only), more
coaching including downpayment assistance, more follow-up contact, and are less likely
to be encouraged to apply for FHA Financing (Hispanic only).  In summary, Black loan
officers appear to treat Hispanics worse than white and Hispanic loan officers, but large
lenders and lenders with a large share of Black applications appear to treat one or more
of the minority groups relatively better and are less likely to steer those minority groups
to high cost FHA financing.
Table 9 shows comparable estimates for the model that controls for tester and
test fixed effects.  The precision of the estimates clearly declines with the degrees of
freedom, and the magnitude of the parameter estimates varies somewhat, but the
overall pattern of results is quite robust.  The one exception is the findings concerning
African-American loan officers.  Specifically, the tendancies of African-American loan
officers to provide more coaching overall and to be more likely to initiate follow-up
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contact with Hispanic testers both drop in magnitude substantially.  The sensitivity of the
estimates associated with loan officer race should not be surprising.  The tester fixed
effect models cannot distinguish between the behavior of minority loan officers and the
behavior of loan officers at lenders who hire a substantial number of minority loan
officers.  The test fixed effects specification mitigates the influence of lender
unobservables such as the tendency to hire minority loan officers.  The reader should
also note that the basic pattern of results observed in Tables 8 and 9 is found in simple
ordinary least squares estimates of treatment, i.e. no tester or test fixed effects.
Table 10 presents the tester fixed effect estimates for Los Angeles.  The
variables that are important for determining treatment are similar, but the pattern of
treatment appears less consistent and the statistical evidence for differential treatment is
relatively weaker.  First, in terms of the treatment of white testers in Los Angeles,
African-American loan officers provide information about fewer products, less
downpayment assistance, and are less likely to initiate follow-up contact, and similarly
Hispanic loan officers provide less downpayment assistance.  On the other hand, both
African-American and Hispanic loan officers are more likely to provide the basic
information requested by the white tester.  Furthermore, the results for number of
products and follow-up contact are not robust to controlling for test fixed effects (table
11).  A larger share of Hispanic loans, i.e. loans to the dominant minority group, is
consistent with a higher likelihood of both follow-up contact and encouraging FHA
financing.  Finally, larger lenders appear less likely to provide coaching assistance
including downpayment assistance.
In terms of differential treatment, only one of the fourteen models of racial and
ethnic differences in treatment is statistically significant at the 5% level or better.  In
addition, none of the significant coefficient estimates in the black model are robust
across more than one treatment variable.  In terms of differential treatment of Hispanic
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testers, African-American loan officers appear to provide Hispanic testers with
information about a relatively larger number of products and are relatively more likely to
provide downpayment assistance.  As in Chicago, larger lenders appear to provide more
favorable treatment to Hispanics in terms of providing the information requested and
providing more coaching including downpayment assistance.  The effect of lender size is
robust to controlling for test effects, but the observed tendency of black loan officers to
provide information about fewer products is not robust, see Table 11.  In summary, the
finding that larger lenders treat Hispanic testers more favorably is robust across
alternative specifications and multiple treatments and consistent with findings for
Chicago.  On the other hand, the relationship between loan officer race and the
treatment of Hispanic testers is less robust and not consistent with findings in Chicago.
Conclusion
This paper finds strong evidence of adverse treatment of African Americans and
Hispanics in the Chicago metropolitan area across a wide variety of pre-application
treatments.  African Americans were less likely to be provided the requested information
during their visit, received detailed information about fewer products, and were provided
with less coaching and were less likely to experience follow-up contact.  Hispanics in
Chicago were quoted lower loan amounts and house prices, received information about
fewer products, and received less coaching.  Furthermore, the finding of adverse
treatment of Hispanic and African-Americans is supported by empirical regularities in the
pattern of treatment.  Larger lenders provide more favorable treatment to black and
Hispanic testers relative to their white teammates in terms of loan amount, coaching,
follow-up contact, and not being steered towards FHA financing.  In addition, lenders
with a larger fraction of African-Americans in their applicant pool provide more favorable
treatment to African-Americans in terms of number of products discussed, amount of
coaching, follow-up contact, and not steering toward FHA financing.
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The evidence of adverse treatment in Los Angeles is substantially weaker.
Statistically significant racial and ethnic differences in treatment are identified for only
two of the six major treatment variables for Hispanic testers and only one of the six for
black testers.  After accounting for the large number of tests conducted, the overall
pattern of differential treatment is not statistically significant.  Similarly, the multivariate
analysis of treatment in Los Angeles provides less support for the notion that minority
testers receive different levels of pre-application information and assistance.  The
multivariate models exhibit less statistical significance overall relative to the models for
Chicago.  In fact, the multivariate analysis finds almost no evidence of systematic
variation in the treatment of black testers in Los Angeles other than on the FHA
encouragement variable.
Two key findings for Los Angeles are worth noting.  Racial differences in the
provision of downpayment assistance are large and statistically significant even after
controlling for the multiple testing environment.  Lower levels of downpayment
assistance for minority testers are identified for three of the four samples suggesting that
adverse treatment of minorities on this particular treatment may be widespread.  In terms
of the multivariate analysis, Hispanics appear to experience relatively more favorable
treatment from large lenders, which is consistent with the findings for black and Hispanic
testers in Chicago.  Accordingly, the study offers fairly strong evidence that large lenders
are less likely to discriminate during the pre-application process than small lenders.
The paper, however, finds some evidence of tester heterogeneity in two of the
four samples:  black-white tests in Los Angeles and Hispanic-Anglo tests in  Chicago.
These findings imply that a tester’s unobserved characteristics may influence his or her
treatment, which suggests that actual differences between testers (other than their race
or ethnicity) can affect the outcomes of tests.  While testers were trained to behave in
similar ways and to follow common protocols, individual differences appear to have
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played some role in determining treatment for these two samples.  While the findings for
Hispanic-Anglo tests in Chicago clearly constitute adverse treatment by ethnicity that is
unrelated to a borrower’s financial qualifications, the findings cannot be unambiguously
interpreted as disparate treatment discrimination.
Nonetheless, this study demonstrates that African American and Hispanic
homebuyers in Chicago face a significant risk of receiving less favorable treatment than
comparable whites across a broad set of loan officer behaviors when they visit mortgage
lending institutions to inquire about financing options.  Discriminatory treatment at this
early stage in the mortgage lending process, though subtle, has the potential to influence
minority borrowers’ ability to obtain credit through a number of important mechanisms.
Minority homeseekers may be discouraged from applying for a mortgage, either
abandoning their housing search or seeking mortgage credit in the subprime market at a
much higher cost.  To the extent that loan officers can influence the underwriting
process, differential treatment at the pre-application stage by the loan officer may
provide an indication of their treatment during underwriting stage.  Finally, loan officers
may provide more support and information to white applicants during the pre-application
and application stages allowing white applicants to prepare an application that has a
better chance of acceptance than the application of a similarly qualified minority
applicant.
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Table 1: Population of Eligible Lending Institutions
# of Institutions Application Volume % of HMDA Activity
Lenders Tested LA Chicago LA Chicago LA Chicago
Lender Population 67 106 89,788 103,017 56 62
Black-White Sample 35 49 81,031 78,655 50 47*
Hispanic-Anglo Sample 34 51 80,447 85,214 50 51*
*During the course of testing, one institution in our sample merged with another large
lender. HMDA application volume for this lender is difficult to determine and is not
represented in these totals.
Table 2: Share of Loans for Lender Samples
Site LA Chicago
Full Full Testing Full Testing
Percent depository 0.429 0.591* 0.642 0.689
Percent African-American 0.072 0.066 0.149 0.108*
Percent Hispanic 0.246 0.283 0.106 0.118
*Represents differences that are significant at the 5% level.  Note that no other
differences were significant even at the 10% level.
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Endnotes
                                                
1 See Ross and Yinger (2002), Turner and Skidmore (1999), Ladd (1998), and Goering
and Wienk (1996) for more extended discussions of these issues.
2 For more information on paired testing and its role in both measurement and
enforcement, see Blank, Dabady, and Citro (2004), Foster, Mitchell, and Fienberg (2002), Ross
(2002) and Fix and Turner (1999).
3 Pair testing attempts to capture disparate treatment as defined by law, which is unequal
treatment of equals based on membership in a protected class while economists often focus on
market discrimination, which is defined as the overall effect of discrimination on market outcomes.
Estimates of disparate treatment may be larger than market discrimination because minorities
can take steps to avoid discriminatory firms.  On the other hand, estimates of market
discrimination can exceed the level of disparate treatment if minorities overcompensate for
discrimination placing them at a disadvantage in negotiations or in high cost market segments,
such as the subprime mortgage market (Ross and Yinger, 2002).
4 Ross and Yinger (2002) and Blackburn and Vermilyea (2003) both find evidence that
market level studies overstate adverse treatment against minorities in lending due to variations in
underwriting standards across lenders.  Paired testing involves sending testers with nearly
identical requests to the same lender, and evidence of disparate treatment arises from direct
comparisons of behavior by the same lender rather than comparisons across lenders as in
market level studies like Munnell et. al. (1996) and Shafer and Ladd (1981).
5 See Ross and Yinger (2002) for a detailed discussion of the ECOA.  Also, see Listokin
and Wyly’s (1998) discussion of industry practices to support fair lending.  Many of these
practices emphasize the training of and the incentives facing loan officers rather than focusing
solely on the loan underwriting system.  Finally, see Lawton (1996) and Smith and Cloud (1993)
for discussions of paired testing in the mortgage market by fair housing groups and the resulting
legal actions brought by those groups.
6 In principle, paired testing might be used to measure discrimination at the application
and underwriting stage of the mortgage lending process as well.  However, most experts believe
that federal laws prohibiting the submission of false credit applications make it impossible to
extend the paired testing methodology into the application stage.  For further discussion of this
issue, see Turner and Skidmore (1999).
7 Temkin, Levy, and Levine’s (1999) case study concluded that the underwriting system
was race neutral in their assessment of the process, but in terms of outcomes they found large
racial disparities in lending, numerous discrimination complaints, and one active law suit under
the ECOA.
8This evidence is consistent with the cultural affinity hypothesis where racial similarities
increase the quality of communication between the borrower and the loan officer leading to
superior outcomes for borrowers who share the same racial and cultural background with loan
officers.  See Bostic (2003) and Longhofer (1996) for additional tests of the cultural affinity
hypothesis in the mortgage market.
9 These empirical tests are based on a theoretical model proposed by Rachlis and Yezer
(1993) where the loan officer provides information to borrowers about the lender’s specific
underwriting standards during the pre-application and application stages of the mortgage
transaction, which affects both the borrower’s application and the likelihood of approval creating a
simultaneity between loan application terms and underwriting.
10These efforts were intended to monitor local lenders and to support legal complaints
against lenders if evidence of discrimination was detected.  Enforcement oriented testing
programs usually place considerably more emphasis on the narrative description of each tester’s
experience, and less effort is expended to precisely match the situation experienced by testers, to
control the behavior of testers during a test, or to record closed form variables that describe
specific treatments experienced by testers.
11 Because of the complexity of the mortgage application process and the challenges it
presents for paired testing, this study was divided into two basic stages:  a pre-test stage and a
pilot stage.  The pre-test stage was used to experiment with a fairly wide variety of paired testing
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scenarios and sources of mortgage financing information. A total of 78 tests were conducted in
Orange County, California and New Orleans, Louisiana in 1999 targeting six different information
sources including conventional mortgage lenders, sub-prime mortgage lenders, mortgage
brokers, real estate agents, new home sales offices, and mobile home dealers.  The pre-tests
also experimented by varying the testing scenario over factors such as whether a specific house
had been identified, the borrower’s qualifications, and visits by couples versus a single tester
posing as a married individual
12 The downpayment constraint is thought to be the most common constraint faced by
first-time homebuyers and is especially relevant to minority homebuyers because black and
Hispanics tend to have substantially lower levels of accumulated assets than whites even after
controlling for income, see Linneman and Wachter (1989) and Charles and Hurst (2002).
13 Although minority and white tester financial characteristics were closely matched,
testing protocols did call for the minority tester to be slightly more qualified that his or her white
partner.
14 Principle and interest were calculated using interest rates of 7.625% for Chicago and
8.25% for Los Angeles and standard annuity tables.
15 Specifically, income and debt were set so that housing expense and total debt expense
to income ratios fell between 0.33 and 0.35 and between 0.255 and 0.265, respectively, which
are well within secondary market guidelines.  Also note that co-borrower income share was set to
a random number between 0.375 and 0.45.
16 HMDA requires all independent mortgage companies and mortgage lenders owned by
depository institutions that make at least 100 home purchase and/or refinancing loans in a given
year to report on the demographic characteristics and location of all applications and loans.
17 This last criteria was verified by pre-test phone calls and where necessary visits to the
lender’s local office.
18 In 1998, HMDA contained 515 and 793 lenders with loan applications for properties
located in Chicago and Los Angeles.  Only 171 and 198 institutions remained in Chicago and Los
Angeles after deleting institutions that did not have a substantial presence in the Chicago or Los
Angeles markets, i.e. at least 90 applications in 1998.  The vast majority of the remaining
institutions that were excluded from the population were not eligible because they did not have
local offices, were credit unions with restricted membership, or were no longer in business at the
time of the study.  Note that the levels and patterns of discrimination may be different for smaller
lending institutions or when inquiries are made by telephone or internet rather than in person.
19 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data reports applications at the lender level rather than
the branch, and therefore Information on the volume of activity conducted by each branch is not
available.
20 Testers were instructed to be precise when providing their financial information and to
refer to their “cheat sheets” if necessary.  Under no circumstances, however, did testers provide a
social security number or date of birth or authorize a credit check. Testers were instructed to
explain that they did not want the lender to run a credit check because they were just beginning
their credit search and did not want their credit history to show a lender’s inquiry.
21 The tester report form and other test instruments are available upon request.
22 Testers also completed a Test Narrative Form providing a detailed, chronological,
account of the test experience in the tester’s own words.  Additional narrative forms were
completed by testers following any phone contact by a lender.  Because of the complexity of
lender testing, the detailed narratives played a particularly important role in quality control.
23 Testers also recorded the terms and conditions of specific loan product they were
offered.  Ideally, one would compare terms and conditions for comparable loan products offered
to both white and minority customers.  However, because HTP protocols called for testers to
approach lending institutions with a very general request for information, the product-specific
information they received was very diverse.  Similar products were listed in different order and
given different names, and testers did not always receive a complete set of terms and conditions
for every product discussed.  Therefore, it is not possible to match products and compare terms
and conditions.
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24 This question is in part driven by the well-documented fact that minority households are
disproportionately represented in the FHA pool of loans after controlling for the financial
characteristics of those loans (Pennington-Cross and Yezer, 2000).
25This is important in interpretating paired tests of housing markets because minorities
may be sometimes favored because white testers are being steered away from certain housing
units or neighborhoods, see Turner, Ross, Galster, and Yinger (2002) and Ross (2000).  In
principle, some mortgage lenders could practice reverse discrimination while other discriminate
against minorities.
26 It is important to note that even when no statistical pattern of race-based differential
treatment is observed, individual cases of discrimination may have occurred.  A qualitative review
of the entire test file might be needed to assess the overall outcome across multiple measures.
27 See Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan (1997) for details on the multinomial distribution.
28 Their results are quite compelling based on the frequency tables.   For one pair, the
minority tester appears is treated worse than their white partner for most tests, and for the other
the minority tester is usually treated better than the white tester.  Given that each tester pair
conducted a random sample of tests, the best explanation is that one minority performed better
than the white tester in terms of obtaining better treatment, and one performed worse.  Note that
there was no evidence of differential experiences across tester pairs for the other three samples
of tests.  Those frequency tables showed that minority testers were consistently treated worse
than their white partners.
29 These data are collected directly from the tester’s employment application at the fair
housing group.
30 While the large number of testers presents some problems in testing for heterogeneity,
Murphy (2002) argues that pair testing efforts should use as large a number of testers as is
feasible in order to base inference on a broad sample of testers.
31 A second issue that arises is the decision to separate white testers from the black-
white and Hispanic-Anglo tests in the same site.  This exactly follows the approach of Heckman
and Siegelman because as with the employment audits the black-white and Hispanic-Anglo tests
documented in our paper were conducted as separate efforts with their own pool of testers and
independent training sessions.
32 As is standard practice, the OLS parameter estimates are presented and the F-
statistics are based on the OLS estimates and the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix.  The
bootstrap required an unusually large number of bootstrap samples because the F-statistics
converged more slowly than the standard errors.  Presumably, the off-diagonal elements of the
variance-covariance matrix converged more slowly than the variance terms.
33 Specifically, no information on house price or loan amount is scored as a zero,
provision of only house price and/or loan amount is a one, additional provision of specific
financing options or product options is a two, additional discussion of financial details is a three,
and both discussion of products and financial details is a four.  Discussion of financial details is
given a higher priority than discussion of products because these details are required for
substantive discussions on financing options, but a reversal of this priority yields very similar
incidences of white and minority favored tests.
34 Specifically, a house price or loan amount is only considered in this comparison if
financial details were exchanged.  Results are very similar when all tests in which both testers
received a loan amount or house price are included in the analysis.
35 Mail and telephone follow-up were given equal weight, with each piece of mail or
telephone call counted as one follow-up contact.
36 In fact, a sign test can be implemented to test whether the significant findings of
adverse treatment of minority testers arise more frequently than findings that are consistent with
favorable treatment. Results have been presented for six classes of treatment and 23 individual
variables representing a total of 24 major and 92 minor hypothesis tests over both groups and
sites.  At a 5 percent significance threshold, 26 of the 92 null hypotheses are rejected in the
direction of finding adverse treatment of minorities, and none are rejected as favorable treatment.
The likelihood of such an event arising by chance is less than 0.0001.  Focusing only on the six
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major treatment categories, 9 of the 24 null hypotheses are rejected in favor of adverse
treatment, none for favorable treatment, and the likelihood of this result arising by chance is less
than 0.005.
37 If we conduct the sign test described in the previous endnote separately for Chicago
and Los Angeles, the likelihood of the Chicago findings arising by chance is less than 0.02 while
the likelihood of the Los Angeles findings arising by chance is 0.50 for the set of major
hypotheses.
38 This definition is equivalent to distinguishing between whether testers were “pre-
qualified” or not.
39 The threshold that financial details be exchanged is consistent with our emphasis on
detailed discussions of options between the loan officer and tester.  The threshold of two products
is chosen because almost all testers in the relevant subsample were told about at least one
product.  Downpayment assistance is used for coaching because this variable is the primary
driver of all empirical findings concerning adverse treatment in coaching, and finally FHA
encouraged is used for the FHA variable because it is rare that FHA is explicitly brought up by the
agent and then discouraged.
40 The sample sizes are less than the sample sizes in Tables 2 and 3 because testers
who conducted a small number of tests have been deleted.
41 See Ross and Yinger (2002) for a more complete discussion of adverse impact
discrimination.
